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American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport: Endorsing a
Presumption of Unconstitutionality Against
Potentially Religious Symbols
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport1 evinces the “hopeless disarray” of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.2 In recent years, the analysis for
determining the constitutionality of arguably religious symbols on
public property has been in constant flux as the Supreme Court has
inconsistently applied various Establishment Clause tests. A court
applying the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
has available to it the Lemon test,3 the coercion test,4 the reindeer
rule,5 the endorsement test,6 and “legal judgment.”7 The uncertainty
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence led the Tenth Circuit to split
5–4 in Davenport on the question of whether to rehear en banc a
case heard by a Tenth Circuit panel, American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan,8 in which the panel struck down a private organization’s practice
of honoring slain Utah Highway patrol officers by erecting crosses
on public property as roadside memorials.9 Two dissenting opinions

1. 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am.
Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
2. Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted).
3. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (formulating a three-pronged
test to determine if there is an Establishment Clause violation).
4. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“The Constitution guarantees
that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise”).
5. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a crèche display did not
violate the Establishment Clause because it was surrounded by other secular holiday symbols).
6. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
plurality opinion) (adopting the endorsement test as proposed by Justice O’Connor in her
concurrence in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688).
7. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)
(“[I]n [borderline] cases, I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”).
8. 616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2010), amended and rev’d, Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
9. Id. at 1150.
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in Davenport highlight the issues with the endorsement test as applied by the Duncan court and signal that the decision furthers a circuit split on the issue of how to correctly apply, and even whether to
apply, the endorsement test.10
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit, by reaffirming its decision in Duncan, approved of an incorrect and incomplete application
of the endorsement test. However, this Note also argues that the
Tenth Circuit’s decision is simply evidence of the need for clarification of Establishment Clause jurisprudence by the Supreme Court.
Part II discusses the various Establishment Clause tests formulated
by the Supreme Court. Part III discusses the facts, procedural history, and decisions of the Tenth Circuit in both Duncan and Davenport. Part IV argues that the Tenth Circuit incorrectly applied the
endorsement test by presuming that the memorials were unconstitutional and by failing to consider constitutionally significant elements
of the memorial at issue, including the names and badge numbers of
the fallen officers, font size, and the purpose of the memorials. Additionally, Part IV argues that Supreme Court clarification of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is necessary to resolve a circuit split on
the issues of whether to apply the endorsement test, and if so, how a
proper endorsement test analysis should proceed. Part V concludes.
II. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part describes the legal background of the Tenth Circuit’s
decisions in Duncan and Davenport and illustrates the complexity
and confusion of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

10. See Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1101 (Kelly, J., dissenting); id. at 1110 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); see also Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1106–07, 1125 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding that a war memorial that includes both a cross and purely secular symbols is
unconstitutional under both the endorsement test and legal judgment test); ACLU of Ky. v.
Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments display
is constitutional under the endorsement test); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419
F.3d 772, 777–78 n.7 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that a Ten Commandments display
is constitutional under the legal judgment test); Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d
395, 408 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a public school’s daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance is constitutional under the legal judgment test).
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A. The Lemon Test

The Lemon test is a three-part test for analyzing Establishment
Clause issues.11 Although Lemon is the “touchstone for Establishment Clause analysis,”12 the test has been repeatedly maligned13 and
has generated much confusion.14 Nonetheless, the three-part Lemon
test provides the starting point for analyzing Establishment Clause
issues. The first part of Lemon requires that the government’s action
“have a secular legislative purpose.”15 Second, the “principal or primary effect [of the government’s action] must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.”16 Finally, the governmental action
“must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”17 Lemon analysis requires that all three prongs of the test be
met for the government to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.18
B. The Reindeer Rule
As a gloss over the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has found
that public displays, even those that are clearly religious and have a
sectarian message, may be constitutional if they are a part of a setting
that “changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose
of the display . . . [and] negates any message of [governmental] endorsement of that content.”19 This rule, termed here the “reindeer

11. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1156.
12. Id. (citations omitted).
13. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (“Persuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged”);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 640 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Abandoning Lemon’s
purpose test . . . [which] has no basis in the language or history of the [First] Amendment . . .
would be a good place to start [clarifying Establishment Clause jurisprudence].”); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The three-part [Lemon] test has
simply not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases.”).
14. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685–86 (2005) (discussing the confusion
caused by the Lemon test).
15. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 613 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 2010), amended
and rev’d, Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
19. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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rule,”20 allows the government to avoid an establishment of religion
by including “purely secular symbols” in a religious display.21
C. The Endorsement Test
The case law underpinning the Establishment Clause became
even more uncertain when the Supreme Court began applying the
Lemon test through the lens of an endorsement test. The endorsement test asks whether “the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a
disapproval, of their individual religious choices.”22 In essence, the
endorsement test modifies the Lemon test by asking “whether the
challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of
‘endorsing’ religion.”23 The key concern underlying the endorsement test is that government be precluded from making citizens feel
like civic outsiders; that is, “from conveying or attempting to convey
a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred.”24
The endorsement test, although commendable in purpose, has
been frequently maligned because it allows for subjective analysis by
judges and thus leads to unpredictability.25 The subjectivity stems

20. The term “reindeer rule” stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v. Donnelly where the Court held that a crèche display that was surrounded by secular decorations
such as a Santa Claus house, reindeer, and a sleigh was constitutional. Id. at 671, 687 (majority
opinion). Courts and commentators ridiculed Lynch by suggesting it created a rule whereby
“the state [could] temper the religious elements of a display with secular symbols” such as plastic reindeer. David Spencer, Note, What’s the Harm? Nontaxpayer Standing to Challenge Religious Symbols, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1071, 1095 (2011); see also ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1569 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[A] city can get by [an Establishment
Clause challenge] with displaying a creche if it throws in a sleigh full of toys and a Santa Claus,
too.”).
21. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
22. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (Blackmun, J., plurality
opinion) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)).
23. Id. at 592.
24. Id. at 593 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted)).
25. See Patrick M. Garry, A Congressional Attempt to Alleviate the Uncertainty of the
Court’s Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Public Expression of Religion Act, 37 CUMB. L.
REV. 1, 12 (2006–07) (“[T]he test calls for judges to speculate about the perceptions that unknown people may have about various religious speech or symbols, its application is inherently
uncertain.”); see also McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 901 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[E]ven if a government could show that its actual purpose was not to advance
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from the test’s use of a “reasonable observer” to determine whether
the display at issue has the purpose or effect of endorsing religion.26
What this “reasonable observer” thinks of the constitutionality of a
given display is left up to a judge’s subjective determination of what
is reasonable. Various Justices have noted that the reasonable observer takes into account, among other things, “the values underlying
the Free Exercise Clause,”27 “cultural diversity,”28 “all the facts and
circumstances surrounding a challenged display,”29 and “the history
and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears.”30
D. The Coercion Test
A majority of the Supreme Court has never relied solely on the
coercion test to decide a case involving potentially religious displays.
However, several members of the Court have indicated that they
would prefer to apply the coercion test in religious display cases.31
The coercion test holds “that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a
way which ‘establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so.’”32
E. The Exercise of Legal Judgment
Two recent Establishment Clause cases decided by the Supreme
Court seem to turn on Justice Breyer’s “legal judgment.” In
McCreary County v. ACLU, the Court held, 5–4, that a display of

religion, it would presumably violate the Constitution as long as the Court’s objective observer
would think otherwise.”).
26. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
27. Id. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
28. Id. at 636.
29. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
30. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
31. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Establishment Clause prohibits only “actual legal coercion”); Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the crèche
display did not violate the Establishment Clause because “[t]here is no suggestion here that
the government’s power to coerce has been used to further the interests of Christianity or Judaism in any way”).
32. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678 (1984)) (additions in quotation omitted).
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the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause.33 The Court emphasized that the history of the display would lead a reasonable observer to think “that the [government] meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’
religious message.”34 Justice Breyer voted with the majority in
McCreary County, but did not write either for the majority or separately.
On the very same day that the Court handed down McCreary
County, it also decided Van Orden v. Perry.35 In Van Orden, the
Court held, 5–4, that a Ten Commandments display located near the
Texas State Capitol building did not violate the Establishment
Clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, focused on
the Ten Commandments’ “undeniable historical meaning.”36 Justice
Breyer concurred with the plurality as to the judgment, but wrote
separately to explain his views on why this display was constitutional.
Justice Breyer explained that for “borderline cases” he saw “no testrelated substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”37 Justice Breyer
offered the following explanation of what is meant by legal judgment:
[Legal] judgment is not a personal judgment. Rather, as in all constitutional cases, it must reflect and remain faithful to the underlying purposes of the [Religion] Clauses, and it must take account of
context and consequences measured in light of those purposes.
While the Court’s prior tests provide useful guideposts—and might
well lead to the same result the Court reaches today—no exact
formula can dictate a resolution to such fact-intensive cases.38

Justice Breyer’s legal judgment in Van Orden led him to focus
on several factors, including: (1) that the display was donated, (2)
that the display had a long history, 40 years, of being unchallenged,
and (3) the context of the display, namely that it was near other monuments. In the end, Justice Breyer’s “legal judgment” led him to
find the Van Orden display constitutional and the McCreary County
display unconstitutional.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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III. THE COURT’S DECISION
A. Facts of the Case

The Utah Highway Patrol Association (Association) is a private
organization that supports the Utah Highway Patrol (UHP).39 In
1998, the Association began a project intended to honor UHP troopers killed in the line of duty.40 The project consisted of placing
twelve-foot crosses near the locations where individual UHP troopers died.41 The Association used white crosses because “only a white
cross could effectively convey the simultaneous messages of death,
honor, remembrance, gratitude, sacrifice, and safety.”42 The crosses
also display a painting of the name, rank, and badge number of the
trooper being honored, the UHP’s beehive symbol, a picture of the
deceased trooper, and a plaque showing biographical information of
the trooper.43
The Association took care to ensure that the memorials would
convey the intended message to passersby, whom the Association
recognized would be passing the memorials at, or above, fifty-five
miles per hour.44 The Association painted the officer’s name and
badge number in large, black lettering.45 Additionally, the Association placed each memorial where it was “(1) visible to the public; (2)
safe to stop and view; and (3) as close to the actual spot of the trooper’s death as possible.”46 The State of Utah does not officially “approve[] or disapprove [of] the memorial markers” but has allowed

39. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2010) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12
(2011).
40. Id.; see also Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2010)
(stating that the UHPA asserted four purposes for erecting the memorials, including “(1) [to]
stand as a lasting reminder . . . that a . . . trooper gave his life in service to [the State of Utah];
(2) [to] remind highway drivers that a trooper died . . . to make the state safe for all citizens;
(3) [to] honor the trooper and the sacrifice he and his family made for the State of Utah; and
(4) [to] encourage safe conduct on the highways”), amended and rev’d, Davenport, 637 F.3d
1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. 12.
41. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1102 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (quoting Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1151).
43. Id.
44. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1151.
45. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1102 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
46. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1151 (citation omitted).
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the Association to erect thirteen markers on public property
throughout Utah.47
B. Procedural History
American Atheists, Inc. (American Atheists) and three of its
members living in Utah challenged the legality of the Association’s
memorials as violating the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution.48 As relief, American Atheists sought both an injunction ordering that the UHP beehive logo be removed from all Association memorials and also a declaration stating that Utah violated
American Atheists members’ constitutional rights by allowing the
UHP logo to be placed on the memorials.49 The district court held
that the memorials did not violate the Establishment Clause.50 American Atheists appealed to the Tenth Circuit.51
C. American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, American Atheists argued that
the memorials violated the Establishment Clause—specifically that
the memorials violated the first and second prongs of Lemon.52 The
Tenth Circuit noted that although Lemon has been questioned, it
remains the “touchstone for Establishment Clause analysis” and
should provide the analytical framework.53 Additionally, the court
stated that it must interpret the first and second prongs of Lemon “in
light of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test.”54 The court stated
that “Justice O’Connor’s modification of the Lemon test makes our
inquiry very case-specific, as it asks this court to examine carefully the

47. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1102 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting Duncan, 616 F.3d at
1151).
48. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1150.
49. Id. at 1152.
50. Id. (additionally, the district court rejected state constitutional claims brought by
American Atheists).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1156. American Atheists did not argue that the memorials violated the third
prong of Lemon. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1156–57 (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, N.M., 541 F.3d 1017,
1030 (10th Cir. 2008)).
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particular context and history of these displays before concluding
what effect they would likely have on the reasonable observer.”55
1. Applying prong one of Lemon
In applying prong one of Lemon, the court stated that “[i]n deciding whether the government’s purpose was improper, a court
must view the conduct through the eyes of an ‘objective observer,’
one who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up
in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, or
comparable official act.”56 Using this standard, the court held that
“[it could] discern a plausible secular purpose.”57 In reaching this
conclusion, the court found two considerations relevant. First, the
Association consistently maintained that its purpose in erecting the
memorials was entirely secular, specifically, to honor fallen highway
patrol troopers and to promote safety on Utah’s highways.58 Second,
the Association’s secular purpose was enhanced “by the fact that the
memorials were designed by two individuals who are members of the
Mormon faith[,] . . . a religion that does not use the cross as a religious symbol.”59 In light of these considerations, the court was willing to attribute the independent Association’s motivation to the
State and hold that the memorials did not violate prong one of Lemon.60
2. Applying prong two of Lemon
Next, the court applied prong two of Lemon, which asks whether
the governmental action has “the effect of communicating governmental endorsement or disapproval” of religion.61 The court stated
that it would answer this question “through the eyes of an objective
observer who is aware of the purpose, context, and history of the
symbol” and “presume[d] that the court-created ‘objective observer’
is aware of information ‘not limited to the information gleaned simp-

55. Id.
56. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1030).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1157.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1158 (quoting Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F. 3d 784, 799
(10th Cir. 2009)).
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ly from viewing the challenged display.’”62 To determine whether
the memorials at issue had the effect of endorsing religion, the court
focused on two aspects: (1) the government’s purpose and (2) the
context and history of the memorials.63
Although the court found that the memorials did not violate the
purpose prong of Lemon, it stated that “[s]eparate from Lemon’s first
test, courts also consider the Government’s purpose in undertaking
the challenged conduct as illustrative of the effect that conduct conveys.”64 The court then briefly restated that the government’s purpose was “to incorporate the UHP symbol into the memorials and
to place the crosses on public land.”65 Even though the government
had a valid secular purpose, the court noted that “the State’s secular
purpose is merely one element . . . we consider . . . to determine
whether these memorial crosses would have an impermissible effect
on the reasonable observer.”66
The court next considered the context and history of the memorials. At the outset, the court stated that the Latin cross “is unequivocally a symbol of the Christian faith.”67 Because of this, “these displays . . . can only be allowed if their context or history avoid the
conveyance of a message of governmental endorsement of religion.”68 The court concluded that the context and history of the
memorials could not save them from unconstitutionality and held
that the memorials had the impermissible effect of conveying to a
reasonable observer that the State was endorsing Christianity.69 The
court reasoned that the fact that the cross also displayed the deceased
trooper’s biographical information did not overcome the government’s message of endorsement.70 This was especially true, the court
reasoned, where most viewers of the monument would see it while
going fifty-five or more miles per hour.71 Additionally, the court rea-

62. Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, N.M., 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005)).
63. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1159.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1022).
68. Id. at 1160.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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soned that “the fact that . . . the fallen UHP troopers are memorialized with a Christian symbol conveys the message that there is some
connection between the UHP and Christianity.”72 Because of this, a
reasonable observer may fear that the UHP would give preferential
treatment to Christians.73 Finally, because of the message they would
convey to a non-Christian walking into the UHP office, the court
noted that it was “deeply concerned about” the two memorial
crosses located outside the UHP office.74
The court’s analysis also rejected four contextual arguments
raised by the State, including: (1) that the displays were clearly intended as memorials; (2) that the displays “are located in areas where
similar memorials have been displayed;” (3) that the designers of the
displays “do not revere the cross;” and (4) that the majority of the
State’s citizens “do not revere the cross.”75 Even admitting “that
some of these contextual elements may help reduce the message of
religious endorsement,” the court nevertheless held “that these displays nonetheless have the impermissible effect of [endorsement].”76
As to the State’s argument that the displays were intended as
memorials, the court stated that although “a reasonable observer
would recognize these memorial crosses as symbols of death[,] . . .
there is no evidence . . . that the cross has been universally embraced
as a marker for the burial sites of non-Christians.”77 Additionally, the
court ultimately rejected the argument that it should “treat memorial
crosses in . . . the same way as the Supreme Court has treated
Christmas trees and . . . the Ten Commandments.”78 Consequently,
“[u]nlike Christmas, which has been widely embraced as a secular
holiday . . . there is no evidence in this case that the cross has been
widely embraced by non-Christians as a secular symbol of death.”79
Additionally, the court concluded that the memorials were unlike a
Ten Commandments display that is a part of a historical presentation
because the memorials here “stand alone, adorned with the state

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1160 n.13.
Id. at 1161–64.
Id. at 1161.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1162.
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highway patrol insignia and some information about the trooper
who died there.”80
The court rejected the State’s second argument—that the cross is
a fairly common symbol used in roadside memorials—because the
State failed to provide “evidence that non-Christians have embraced
the use of crosses as roadside memorials.”81 Moreover, the court
claimed that even if the roadside cross was a secular symbol of death,
“the memorial crosses . . . in this case appear to be much larger than
the crosses typically found on the side of public roads.”82
The court rejected the State’s third argument—that the designers
of the memorial did not revere the cross—because the memorials
may have impermissibly affected a reasonable observer, regardless of
the creator’s intent.83 The court stated that “the intended and perceived significance of [the State’s] conduct may not coincide with
the thinking of the monument’s donor or creator.”84
Finally, the court rejected the State’s fourth argument—that only
a minority of Utah citizens reveres the cross as a religious symbol.85
The court noted that “it is [not] implausible, as a general matter, for
a [government] . . . to endorse a minority faith.”86 Based on this
principle, the court held that “the fact that most Utahns do not revere the cross as a symbol of their faith does not mean that the State
cannot violate the Establishment Clause by conduct that has the effect of promoting the cross.”87
D. Denial of Rehearing Duncan En Banc
Just over four months after deciding Duncan, a five-judge majority refused to rehear the case en banc.88 The majority did not elaborate on the Duncan opinion, except only to amend one word.89 Four

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1163.
84. Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 (2009)).
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 n.64 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
87. Id. at 1163–64.
88. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1101 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
89. Id.
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judges dissented from the decision not to rehear the case en banc,
and two judges wrote dissenting opinions expressing their views.90
1. Judge Kelly’s dissent
Judge Kelly dissented and focused his argument on what he saw
as the court’s “increasing[] hostil[ity] to religious symbols in the
public sphere”91 in contravention of the Supreme Court’s recent
statement that “the Establishment Clause does not require us to
‘purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes in the religious.’”92 Judge Kelly argued that the Duncan court’s reasonable
observer analysis was problematic in three important ways. First, the
court’s analysis employed a presumption against constitutionality in
contravention of precedent.93 Under this newly created presumption,
the cross is viewed as a religious symbol, unless contextual elements
are sufficient to overcome that presumption.94 Second, the court’s
reasonable observer failed to properly consider the appearance, context, and history of the memorials.95 Finally, Judge Kelly found it
problematic that “the court equates the religious nature of the cross
with a message of endorsement.”96
2. Judge Gorsuch’s dissent
Judge Gorsuch wrote a dissenting opinion in which he agreed
with much of Judge Kelly’s reasoning, but also wrote to add two additional disagreements with the Duncan court.97
First, Judge Gorsuch disagreed with Duncan’s application of the
reasonable observer test.98 Judge Gorsuch argued that the Duncan
observer “starts with the biased presumption that Utah’s roadside
crosses are unconstitutional” and that the observer “disregards
the . . . secularizing details—such as the fallen trooper’s name in-

90. Id.
91. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring
in judgment) (emphasis omitted).
93. Id. at 1102–03.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1101–02.
96. Id. at 1102.
97. Id. at 1107 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1107–08.
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scribed on the crossbar—that might allow him to change his
mind.”99 Additionally, Judge Gorsuch noted that “[i]t seems we
must also take account of our observer’s selective and feeble eyesight”100 because the Duncan observer seems unable to see the deceased trooper’s name on the cross even though the same text size is
used to paint the name as is used “for posting the words ‘SPEED
LIMIT’ alongside major . . . highways.”101 Judge Gorsuch summed
up his argument by stating that “[the Tenth Circuit] will strike down
laws other courts would uphold, and do so whenever a reasonably
biased, impaired, and distracted viewer might confuse them for an
endorsement of religion.”102
Judge Gorsuch’s second point was that the reasonable observer
test may itself be “constitutionally problematic.”103 Judge Gorsuch
noted that in this case it was “undisputed that the state actors here
did not act with any religious purpose,” and thus “the court strikes
down Utah’s policy only because it is able to imagine a hypothetical
‘reasonable observer’ who could think Utah means to endorse religion—even when it doesn’t.”104 Judge Gorsuch took the Duncan
court to task for choosing not to apply the approach taken by other
courts, including a plurality in Van Orden, who declined to apply the
endorsement test and questioned its application in Establishment
Clause cases.105
IV. ANALYSIS
This Note critiques the Tenth Circuit’s application of the endorsement test and suggests that the court failed to consider important contextual elements that could lead a reasonable observer to
conclude that the memorials did not have the impermissible effect of
endorsing religion. Additionally, this Note argues that the Supreme
Court should clarify Establishment Clause jurisprudence with regard
to potentially religious displays.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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A. The Tenth Circuit’s Misapplication of the Endorsement Test

As an initial matter, the Tenth Circuit misapplied the endorsement test by reversing traditional endorsement test analysis. The traditional endorsement test first analyzes the context, history, and appearance of a memorial before finding it unconstitutional.106 For
example, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Supreme Court was
presented with the question of whether a crèche display and a menorah display located outside a city building were unconstitutional.107
The Court rejected the dissent’s approach, which would have employed a presumption of unconstitutionality because the symbols
were inherently religious and displayed on public property.108 Rather,
the Court employed the traditional endorsement test analysis by analyzing the appearance, history, and contextual elements of the displays.109 The Tenth Circuit set the bar too high for the State by
holding that because the cross is the “preeminent symbol of Christianity” it would only be permissible “if the[] context or history
avoid[ed] the conveyance of a message of governmental endorsement of religion.”110 Rather than employ traditional endorsement
analysis as the Court in County of Allegheny did, the Tenth Circuit
reversed the analysis by presuming that the cross is a religious symbol
and is therefore unconstitutional. Only after this presumption was in
place did the court look to see if the context or history suggested
otherwise.
Apart from the issue of the Duncan majority presuming the memorials were unconstitutional, the majority’s version of the reasonable observer undervalues the effect a valid secular purpose has on the
reasonable observer. A State’s secular purpose is one contextual element that the Tenth Circuit factors into determining whether a religious symbol would have an impermissible effect upon a reasonable
observer.111 The Duncan majority frequently reasoned that the
crosses were large and easily seen by passersby.112 The large size of
106. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598–600 (1989).
107. Id. at 578.
108. Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 616–20 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
110. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010), amended and
rev’d, Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Utah
Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
111. Id. at 1159.
112. See, e.g., id. at 1162.
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the crosses led the court to hold that the memorials had the impermissible effect of endorsing religion.113 Yet, the court also found that
the State’s purpose in allowing the Association to erect the crosses
was not impermissible.114 One is left to wonder how the Association,
and by implication the State, could effectively accomplish the permissible purpose of memorializing slain troopers and informing the
public of the trooper’s service without using a memorial that is big
enough for the public to view as they pass by at fifty-five or more
miles per hour. The court’s analysis effectively puts the State in a
catch-22 where it could either build crosses so small that they could
not fulfill the State’s valid secular purpose, or build the crosses as
they were here but suffer the fate of unconstitutionality. One response to this argument is that the State could simply use something
other than a cross to convey its valid secular purpose, and in the future it would seem prudent for the State to do so. However, it nonetheless seems illogical that the court could find that the State had a
valid secular purpose for putting up the crosses, yet still hold that it
acted unconstitutionally by putting up a memorial big enough to effectively carry out its purpose. A state’s clearly secular purpose
should be given more weight in analyzing the effect a memorial has
on the reasonable observer.
The Tenth Circuit also erred in its reasonable observer analysis
by failing to give sufficient weight to the contextual elements surrounding the crosses. For example, the court acknowledged that the
contextual elements surrounding the crosses “may help reduce the
message of religious endorsement,” yet held that the crosses violated
the second prong of Lemon.115 This holding fails to “acknowledge
the entirety” of the contextual elements surrounding the crosses.116
For example, the Duncan court’s reasonable observer fails to acknowledge that the officer’s name, rank, and badge number are emblazoned in large writing on the cross in the same font size as the
words “SPEED LIMIT” on interstate highway signs. A reasonable
observer would certainly take this into account and would be more
likely to find that the memorial is meant to honor the person whose
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1159.
115. Id. at 1161.
116. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2010) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12
(2011).
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name is written on the cross than that it is meant to endorse religion.
Further, the court noted that it has particular concern over the
crosses in front of the UHP office.117 This concern cuts against the
court’s argument that the memorials are especially troubling when
the general public passes a majority of the monuments while traveling at fifty-five or more miles per hour. It could be true that the reasonable observer would “miss” seeing the contextual elements surrounding the cross when traveling at high speeds. But in the case of
the memorials in front of the UHP office, this concern is not
present. Rather, the reasonable observer would have plenty of time
to observe and examine the memorials to determine their context
and thus should be less likely, not more likely, to find that these
memorials have the impermissible effect of endorsement. At any rate,
even though the memorials at issue in this case should have satisfied
the Tenth Circuit panel’s reasonable observer because of the secularizing contextual factors, as Judge Gorsuch notes in his dissent,
courts should not have to take account of a reasonable observer who
is “biased, impaired, [or] distracted.”118
B. The Need for Supreme Court Clarification of Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence
While the Tenth Circuit arguably erred in its application of the
endorsement test,119 what Duncan and Davenport actually highlight
most are not the errors of the Tenth Circuit, but rather the lack of
guidance from the Supreme Court in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.120 A consequence of the Supreme Court’s “nebulous Establishment Clause”121 jurisprudence is that lower courts rely more
heavily on their own precedents, rather than face the daunting task
of distilling into a workable rule the confusing and seemingly arbitrary Supreme Court Establishment Clause precedents. Indeed, this
is exactly what the Tenth Circuit did in Duncan. Before applying the
endorsement test, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
117. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1161 n.13.
118. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1110 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
119. See supra notes 106–18 and accompanying text.
120. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 22 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[O]ur Establishment Clause precedents
remain impenetrable . . . [and] [i]t is difficult to imagine an area of the law more in need of
clarity.”).
121. Id. at 13.
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remains “sharply divided on the standard governing Establishment
Clause cases.”122 Because of this sharp divide, the Tenth Circuit
turned to its own precedent to determine the controlling test for Establishment Clause challenges.123 Yet, even though it relied heavily
on its own precedent, uncertainty about how to apply the endorsement test still crept into the court’s decision. For example, when discussing what the endorsement test’s reasonable observer can be assumed to know the court noted that “[h]ow much information we
will impute to a reasonable observer is unclear.”124 Uncertainty such
as this is not the fault of lower courts. Justice Thomas recently stated
as much when he said, “One might be forgiven for failing to discern
a workable principle that explains these wildly divergent outcomes. . . . Whether a given court’s hypothetical observer will be any
beholder (no matter how unknowledgeable), or the average beholder, or . . . the ultra-reasonable beholder, is entirely unpredictable.”125
In the end, courts will continue to disagree widely over core Establishment Clause jurisprudential issues, including whether the endorsement test or some other test controls in Establishment Clause
religious symbol cases. And assuming the endorsement test does
control, what does the reasonable observer see, feel, and know with
respect to that religious display? The current circuit split suggests
that these core disagreements are already taking place, and it is likely
that the split will only widen in coming years unless the Supreme
Court intervenes and clarifies Establishment Clause jurisprudence.126
V. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit’s opinions in Duncan and Davenport compound and perpetuate the confusion caused by the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, specifically the endorsement
test. Even assuming that the endorsement test is still the preferred
Establishment Clause test, the Duncan court failed to properly apply

122. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (2010), amended and rev’d,
Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. 12.
123. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s application of its own precedent see Steven
M. Lau, Note, Ignoring Purpose, Context, and History: The Tenth Circuit Court in American
Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 2011 BYU L. REV. 149.
124. Id. at 1159 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 19–20 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
126. See supra note 10.

388

DO NOT DELETE

371

3/20/2012 11:14 AM

American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport

the test because it did not properly consider all of the context, history, and purposes of the memorials. Unfortunately, this precedent will
stand because the Supreme Court has rejected the opportunity to use
Duncan to clear up the muddled Establishment Clause jurisprudential waters.127
Eric B. Ashcroft*

127. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n., 132 S. Ct. at 12 (denying certiorari); id. at 13 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Justice Thomas noted that he would have granted
certiorari “[b]ecause [the Court’s] jurisprudence has confounded the lower courts and rendered the constitutionality of displays of religious imagery on government property anyone’s
guess.”); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (holding that lower courts must “leav[e] to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions); Eugene Volokh, A Possible Endorsement Test Case for the U.S.
Supreme Court?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 21, 2010 6:02 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/12/21/a-possible-endorsement-test-case-for-the-u-s-supremecourt-2.
 J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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